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Abstract
The paper gives a geometry based explanation for organization ecology’s resource partitioning
theory. The original theory explains market histories of generalist and specialist organizations
with scale economies. We show that the main predictions can be restated in terms of certain
structural properties of the n-dimensional Euclidean resource space. We model customer demand
elaboration with the increasing number of dimensions (taste descriptors), and demonstrate that
the resulting change in spatial configurations increases market concentration and enhances
resource partitioning. The original and the proposed models of resource partitioning are
complementary: their predicted effects add up and drive the events towards the perceived market
phases. Moreover, each approach answers questions that the other cannot address.
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1. Introduction
Multidimensional spaces are well understood tools of social scientists to represent
objects with several attributes. We model our entities, organizations, as spatial bodies
with certain geometric properties (volume, shape, symmetries) that stand for certain
organizational traits. Spatial configurations of bodies represent relations between our
objects, and geometry specifies constraints on their available configurations. For non-
expert appliers of geometry like the authors, it was quite surprising to discover these
constraints; to restate deeply influential effects for organizational populations in terms of
clear-cut geometric considerations. Hence the objective our paper: to demonstrate that
the claims of an empirically tested sociological theory, the resource partitioning model of
organization ecology (Carroll 1985, 1987, 1997; Carroll and Hannan 1995) can be
explained with structural properties of the multidimensional bodies.
The Euclidean space represents the market in resource partitioning theory; it is the
scaffold on which organizational interactions take place. The n-dimensional space has
different names in the different market models of organization sociology and economics.
It is called  product characteristics space when spatial axes stand for descriptors of
commodities (Lancaster 1966). It is called competence space if  production skills are in
focus (Nooteboom 1994a; Péli and Nooteboom 1997). Its name is resource space in
organizational ecology, when customers with different tastes constitute the key resource
for organizational populations (Carroll 1985; Carroll and Hannan 1995).
We adopt the last, resource oriented interpretation: customer tastes are n-
dimensional points in space, each featuring a certain amount of demand. Organizations
are represented by the tastes they address, i.e. the subsets of resource space they exploit
(niches, catchment areas). Competition is modeled as niche overlap (Hannan and
Freeman 1977, 1989). Under certain conditions, markets (resource spaces) are
partitioned between organizations that realize a more or less peaceful coexistence, just
as the Earth’s surface is partitioned between countries (Carroll 1985). Competitive and
convivialist phases may follow each other as markets develop. Our work intends to
contribute to the understanding of these resource partitioning histories.
The simplest and most widely studied way of market partitioning is to assign the
same catchment area to each organization. A classic one-dimensional example is
Hotelling’s linear city model of product differentiation (1929) also readdressed as3
"circular city" by Salop (1979). Nooteboom (1993) investigated the possibilities of the
multidimensional generalization of the market partitioning problem. How can the n-
dimensional Euclidean space be partitioned between congruent and regular polytopes,
the n-dimensional generalizations of polyhedra? The goal was to specify
multidimensional “honeycombs” with sphere-like cells, or in socio-economic terms,
organizations with equal catchment areas in a product characteristics space. A survey of
the mathematical literature revealed that the underlying tessellation problem has no
regular and sphere-like solution beyond two dimensions (Coxeter 1948).1
We address the space partitioning problem differently. We assume that catchment
areas are not polytopes but n-dimensional spheres (hyperspheres). Even higher
dimensional hyperspheres are handy objects, their volume and surface depend only on
their radii and thus can be easily calculated.2 However, spaces cannot be completely
covered by spheres without overlap: if n > 1, then there is always some residual left
between the hyperspheres. That is, some demand must be left unsatisfied by
organizations with spherical niches. The ubiquitous presence of leftout space around
spheres is a mathematical inconvenience in equipartition models. However, the same fact
can have an explanatory function if one allows for the existence of organizations with
small niches, called specialists in the organizational literature (Levins 1968; Brittain and
Freeman 1980; Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Péli 1997).
Specialist organizations can populate residual regions or "holes" between organizations
of broader niches (generalists).
The paper concentrates on these holes. It shows that a field in geometry, known as
the sphere packing problem (Section 3), provides useful and somewhat surprising inputs
for the sociology of organizations. Applying the results of this domain to resource
partitioning theory (Section 2), one can explain a lot from the dynamics of generalist-
specialist markets. While the original model explains resource partitioning processes on
the basis of scale economies, now the results obtain from structural properties of n-
dimensional arrangements. The original and the proposed explanations are
                                                       
1  Sphere-likeliness means that catchment areas have similar extensions in each direction.
Soccer balls are sphere-like polihedra, but they are not regular, their surface being composed of
pentagons and hexagons. The only regular (but not sphere-like) polytopes that equipartition the
space if n ¹ 2 and n ¹ 4 are the hypercube, the n-dimensional generalization of the cube, and
the hyper-octahedron.
2 For the sake of convenience, we use the words hypersphere and sphere synonimously,
though literally the second denotes 3D objects.4
complementary: first, both approaches specify effects that point in the same direction,
thus reinforcing each other; second, each explains aspects for which the other, alone,
could not give an account.
Resource inhomogeneity is a crucial assumption in the original, scale economy
based resource partitioning model: demands have an uni- or polymodal distribution in
space. On the contrary, the geometric approach goes along with the assumption that
customer demand is homogeneously distributed. The two models can be seen as two
layers of explanation for the same phenomena. The geometric explanation (flat demand
distribution) serves as a background. The second layer adds complexity to the first:
peaks in the demand distribution that yield scale economy advantages.3
The potential applications of the sphere packing problem in the social sciences go
far beyond organizational ecology. Beside product differentiation and market
positioning, the same approach may have a bearing for political sociology (e.g., for the
line of research reported by Kollman, Miller and Page 1992). How should political
parties position their catchment areas in the space of potential voters, minimizing both
residual space and overlap? Since network structures are related to environmental
resources, some structural holes in social networks (Burt 1992) may correspond to holes
in resource exploitation.4 The presented approach may help at data evaluation. For
example, the task of finding appropriate cluster centers in cluster analysis seems to be
related to the quantizer problem in mathematical communication theory (Conway and
Sloane 1988) which also goes back to the search of optimal sphere packings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the original resource
partitioning theory: What are the main predictions and explanatory elements? What is its
position in current organizational and economic theories? Section 3 comes up with the
alternative geometric considerations: Similar phenomena, but a different explanatory
structure. Section 4 assesses the strength and the shortcomings of the proposed
explanation; methodological benefits, empirical ramifications are addressed.
                                                       
3 These two layers were originally three, because first Glenn Carroll used homogeneous
resource distributions and circular niches in two dimensions in his resource partitioning paper
(1985).
4 Burt suggests a conceptualization of population niche in network terms; his rephrasing shifts
the emphasis from resources to relationship patterns that provide access to these resources
(1992:210).5
2. Resource Partitioning with Scale Economies
2.1 Model and Ramifications
The resource partitioning model was delineated by Glenn Carroll who analyzed the
history of American newspaper publishing (1985). The theory explains the long term
history of markets composed of generalist and specialist organizations. The market is an
n-dimensional Euclidean space with axes that denote taste descriptors; thus, each point
in space stands for a certain customer taste. Generalist and specialist organizations are
characterized with their niche width. Generalists make appeals to a broad range of
customer tastes while specialists focus to specific ones. Accordingly, a generalist’s niche
is a broad region in the resource space, while specialists occupy small spots. A given
customer type purchases if some organizations offer the kind of product that it needs.
The taste distribution is uneven over the population, the market has a center (or a few
centers) composed of mainstream tastes. Organizational resources (demand) are
abundant in the center, so the incumbent organizations can grow big. The taste
distribution is often conceptualized as normal along each taste axis (Carroll and Hannan
1995:217-219).
This setting gives rise to the following population history. Early in the market, the
surviving firms are mainly generalists. To increase sales, generalists tend to differentiate
themselves by differentiating their product offers, placing their niches apart from each
other as much as possible. Product differentiation is also a way to reduce competition
(Eaton and Lipsey 1989), since niche overlap measures the intensity of competition. The
occupant organizations of the resourceful central regions grow bigger than the others,
and the induced increase in size variation yields scale economy advantages: the big firms
get even bigger, forcing the medium size generalists out from the market. The number of
generalist organizations falls while their average size grows. Market concentration
increases.
A crucial element in the model is that the life chances of emerging small specialist
organizations is attached to the concentration level of generalists: high concentration
opens little resource pockets for specialists. This happens as follows. As medium size
organizations disappear, resources become unbound. The surviving generalists take the
best chunks of the residual space, positioning themselves in market centers. As fights6
between generalists die out, product differentiation loses its importance. Having no
strong competitors around, the survivor generalists feel less pressure to make dedicated
bids for specific customer tastes; they rather adjust their offers to the mainstream needs
at the centers. In the newspaper industry, this means following a middle-of-the-road
editorial policy (Carroll 1985). In industries like breweries and medical diagnostics
(Swaminathan 1995a; Mitchell 1995) a market center can be also seen as a common
denominator of tastes: some general products satisfy a great portion of needs for a broad
range of customers.
The surviving generalists increase their niche width, taking over the best chunks of
the extinct competitors’ market segments. But as expanding generalists march towards
market centers, they also leave some customers unsatisfied at the edges. Small specialist
organizations may establish footholds in these market pockets. Furthermore, taste
distributions often get flatter as markets develop, increasing resource abundance at the
edges (Carroll and Hannan 1995). Specialists’ life chances are tightly related to market
concentration under this explanation. These organizations do not threaten the generalists
who may let them survive in the deserted edges of the resource space. In the end, there is
no competition but a kind of conviviality between the survivor generalists and the
newcomer specialists. The latter are the scavengers of the resource space exploiting what
is left behind by generalist predators.
Summarizing the stages of market history: mainly generalists populate early
markets; their number decreases with time; the surviving generalists broaden their niche
and position themselves into market centers; resource pockets open up for specialists.
2.2 Empirical Evidence and Questions
A rapidly growing set of research in a broad variety of industries gives empirical support
to the outlined theoretical picture. Resource partitioning effects were detected in the
brewing industry (Carroll and Swaminathan 1992, 1993; Swaminathan 1995a), in
banking co-operatives (Freeman and Lomi 1994, Lomi 1995), in wine production
(Swaminathan 1995b), in medical diagnostic imaging (Mitchell 1995), and in
microprocessor production (Wade 1996). Earlier, Barnett and Carroll (1987) observed a
symbiotic relation between telephone companies occupying different niches in the same
location: these organizations exerted a positive influence on each other’s fate. Recently,
Dobrev (1997) analyzed the restructuration process of the Bulgarian newspaper industry7
during the political transition, applying the resource partitioning framework to an
environment substantially different from American markets. The research of Torres
(1995) and Seidel (1997) investigate, respectively, the British automobile and the
American Airline industry in a resource partitioning framework.
Studies on size-localized competition between organizations also revealed similar
effects to those claimed by resource partitioning theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977;
Hannan and Ranger-Moore 1990; Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl 1990).
Organizations of very different sizes typically differ in strategy and structure, and
competition tends to be stronger among structurally similar organizations. Since
generalists and specialists can be quite different both in size and structure, the losers of
size-localized competition are mostly the medium size generalists.5 Some current
economic theories address similar concentration issues as the resource partitioning
model. The study of Boone and Witteloostuijn (1995) analyses the connection between
organizational ecology and the field of industrial organization, looking for overlaps and
possibilities for cross-fertilization. The authors pointed out a series of similarities
between resource partitioning model and Sutton's dual structure theory (1991) on
industry concentration.
We mention some effects that are hard to explain exclusively with scale economy
advantages. The first concerns market center. This notion involves a peak in the demand
distribution. If only scale economies govern competition, then the Macbeth-effect
applies: there is only one place at the top. Otherwise, the winner organizations might be
of exactly the same size (which is quite improbable), because scale economy effects
would magnify even minor differences, finally leaving a single organization in place.
How can the model allow for the survival of more than one generalist in the long run?
Remaining in the context of scale economy explanations, a possible solution is to assume
polymodal taste distributions; then a handful of generalists may survive in the resulting
landscape, each occupying a different market center. The low demand ditches around the
resource heights may keep the incumbent organizations away from appropriating the
neighbor’s domain. Though such outcomes do occur, the proposed setting replicates the
original problem: each local center can be occupied by only one player. More general
solutions should require additional explanatory elements, for example, institutional
                                                       
5 Taking into account other aspects, medium size generalists may have their chances.
Investigating the California loan and savings industry, Haveman (1993) found that medium size
organizations are the most willing to diversify their activities into new domains.8
aspects (Meyer and Scott 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Zucker 1989).
We propose another solution, explaining resource partitioning without reference to
abundant resource spots in space .
Two other effects to explain are specialists’ presence in early markets and their
occasional persistence in non-marginal market segments. How can specialists appear
before the survivor generalists move to the market centers leaving behind resources at
the margins? Why should the big generalist organizations tolerate specialists to gaze on
the rich central parts of the resource base? The original model handles these, in fact
rarely occurring, effects as disturbances. The geometric approach will show that some
room does open for specialists in each segment of the market and even in early phases of
the market history.
3. The Geometric Resource Partitioning Model
3.1 Spherical Niches
Organizations are represented by their niches in the resource space. Consider generalists
as n-dimensional hyperspheres that populate the space. The market is a region in this
space, sufficiently extended in each direction and filled up tightly with spheres without
overlap (Figure 1). Spherical niche shape is a crucial aspect in our model, so we give a
number of arguments to justify this assumption.
The first argument concerns isotropy, the invariance of directions in the resource
space. If spatial directions do not count, then other things being equal, organizations
develop the same niche breadth in any direction. However in reality, taste descriptors do
differ in importance. This fact could be incorporated into the model by assigning a set of
weights to the dimensions, and performing affine transformations along each axis with
these weights. Instead of having hyperspheres, then we arrive to the n-dimensional
analogues of ellipses (in 3D: rugby balls). Affine transformations do not affect volume
ratios, therefore the geometric arguments in this paper will also apply when taste
descriptors differ in importance. For the sake of convenience, we assume that all taste
variables are standardized, and so proceed with spheres instead of ellipses. However,
the shape of organizational niches can be also affected by the neighboring competitors.
Organizations may also consider to extend their niches in certain directions to occupy9
some close chunks of the residual space. We will discuss stabilizing effects in 3.5. Here
we also mention some forces that penalize radius deviation.
One argument is clearly economic. It is reasonable to postulate a structure of
producer costs with a variable cost as some increasing function of the niche volume, and
a fixed capacity cost as an increasing function of the largest distance of customers from
the center. The latter determines the "reach" that the producer has to serve distant
customers (by product adaptation or sales support). Capacity cost then is determined by
the largest distance that any customer has from the center. Any asymmetric niche then
entails excess, unutilized capacity. Thus, in a consideration of asymmetrical niche
extension there is a trade-off between the additional sales that it yields and the cost of
unutilized capacity. The greater the share of fixed capacity cost, the sooner the trade-off
will be in favor of maintaining a niche that is symmetrical in all directions, i.e., a
hypersphere. This yields an empirical prediction: niches are spherical (vs. asymmetric)
to the extent that fixed capacity costs (vs. variable costs) prevail. An example of low
capacity cost would be the delivery of newspapers, where one pays independent delivery
people a fee for every extra paper delivered. Here fixed capacity costs are zero, and
every delivery man will explore extensions of the boundary in his area, regardless of
what others do. Some may directly bump into competitors and stop, while others can
proceed further until they meet opposition, so that irregular niches will obtain. A special
interpretation of capacity cost is that extending reach has negative consequences for
quality throughout the niche (principle of allocation, Levins 1968, Hannan & Freeman
1989), or makes brand image too diffuse. The argument then is that with asymmetric
extension there is an increase of sales which is small relative to the loss of quality or
brand image.
Another argument for spherical niche shape takes the surface of spatial objects into
account. Spheres have the smallest surface among all bodies of the same volume, which
is why soap bubbles and planets like Earth have the globe shape. This rule also holds for
hyperspheres in any numbers dimensions higher than one. What is the problem with
large niche surface? The points at the margins stand for customers whose tastes are least
matched by the organization at hand. In lack of a fitting offer, the “buy or not to buy”
question is less settled for these people than for others (inside zones). Moreover, they
can also choose the products of neighboring organizations without a serious compromise
in their taste preferences. Customers close to the surface are not stable customers, extra
sales efforts may be necessary to attract and bind them. Thus, it may be economical to10
minimize surface relative to volume, which yields the sphere.
Accepting that at least in a significant number of cases niches are spherical, the number
of generalists in a market of given size and resources is determined by the sphere radius
and by the manner of sphere packing. The first, sphere radius, is assumed to be similar
for each generalist for the time being. The second aspect, spatial configuration, leads to
the application of the sphere packing problem. The next subsection summarizes some
important features of this field.
Table 1. The Known Densest Packings with Kissing Numbers and the Known
Thinnest Coverings
Dim.
n
Packing density
D
Kissing number
t
Thinnest covering
Q
1 1 2 1
2 0.90690 6 1.2092
3 0.74048 12 1.4635
4 0.61685 24 1.7655
5 0.46526 40 2.1243
6 0.37295 72 2.5511
7 0.29530 126 3.0596
8 0.25367 240 3.6658
9 0.14577 272 4.3889
10 0.09962 372 5.2517
11 0.06624      519.78 6.2813
12 0.04945 756 7.5101
13 0.03201     1060.67 8.9768
14 0.02162 1422          10.727
15 0.01686 2340          12.817
16 0.01471 4320          15.31111
17   0.008811 5346          18.288
18   0.005958 7398          21.841
19   0.004121         10668          26.082
20   0.003226         17400          31.143
Source: Conway and Sloane (1988: 15, 38). Note that t is not always integer; if hyperspheres
have different number of neighbors in a packing, then t is calculated as an average.
Figure 1. Dense Sphere Packings in 1 - 3 Dimensions
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3.2 The Sphere Packing Problem
The sphere packing problem is concerned with ways of filling up the n-dimensional
Euclidean space with hyperspheres of equal size (Conway and Sloane 1988). The main
issue is to find dense packings, configurations where the space ratio occupied by spheres
is high. For example: How can one heap the biggest number of melons on a trolley in the
market place?
The efficiency of a sphere packing is measured by packing density (D), the ratio of
the volume occupied by the spheres to total space volume (0 £ D £ 1). Unfortunately, no
general solution to the sphere packing problem is known yet, the densest packings are
known for sure only up to two dimensions. In one dimension, the hyperspheres are
sections of equal length along a line. If the neighboring sections meet, then packing
density is unity (Figure 1a). In two dimensions, hyperspheres are circles. The densest is
the hexagonal packing (D = 0.9069...) that obtains by pulling circles into a honeycomb
pattern (Figure 1b).
From n = 3 several dense packings are known, but not the densest ones. In three
dimensions, intuition suggests that the cannon-ball packing is the densest (Figure 1c).
Gauss proved in 1831 that this is the best among lattice packings, arrangements in13
which a configuration of spheres repeats itself in space.6 But, even if the densest
packings are not precisely known, some upper bounds on packing density can be
calculated for any n. Fortunately, the known densest packings approximate these bounds
quite well for not very high dimensions (Table 1). It is also proven for big n-s that
adding an n+1
th dimension to the space amounts to dividing the highest packing density
in n with a number between 1.51 and 2 (Conway and Sloane 1988:20). That is, packing
density converges pretty fast to zero as the number of spatial dimensions increases.
This result is just the opposite of what one might expect. Consider the following
thought experiment! Replace the spheres with soft balloons in the assumed-to-be-best
cannon ball packing (Figure 1c), and inflate them simultaneously. The balloons press
against each other as pressure increases, gradually taking the shape of polyhedra equal
in size and shape. Finally, the resulting polyhedra fill up the residual space. Applying a
similar procedure to the densest packings in higher dimensions, one would end up in a set
of convex (but not regular) polytopes that equipartition the space. These cells become
more and more complex with n: more vertices, edges, surfaces, etc. Intuition might
suggest that they gradually take the shape of hyperspheres as n goes to infinity, just like
snowballs are formed by pressing a piece of snow from several directions. However, the
partitioning cells cannot converge to hyperspheres with n, because the density of any
complete space partitioning is 1 by definition, while the limit value of sphere packing
density is zero if n goes to infinity. The following subsections discuss those properties of
n-dimensional sphere packings that account for some core elements of resource
partitioning theory.
3.3 Dimensional Expansion: New Opportunities for Specialists
We describe resource partitioning processes with a single explanatory variable: the
increasing number of spatial dimensions. Since axes stand for taste descriptors, an
increase in n reflects customer taste elaboration. We concentrate on markets where the
appearance of new taste dimensions deeply influence purchases, like user friendliness in
the computer industry in the eighties or car airbags in the nineties. After each increase in
dimension, organizational bids fold out into the extended space. For example, circular
niches take globe shape in moving to three dimensions.
                                                       
6 The sphere centers form an additive group in lattice packings (Conway and Sloane 1988:3-4).14
We do not address other forms of customer demand elaboration in this paper, though
they may influence population histories. For example, scale extension (offering extra
size products) can provide opportunities for specialists. Scale refinement (intermediate
product sizes, qualities) may establish stepping-stones over the demarcation lines
between remote market segments, enabling some generalists to invade the neighbors’
domain. Something like this may have happened in 1983, when the mainframe computer
producer IBM made its D-day introducing the XT to the personal computer market
(Anderson 1994).
The most debated claim in resource partitioning theory is specialists' emergence in
mature markets (Carroll 1997). How can these organizations persist in places densely
packed with big generalists?7 Actually, this is also the most accessible aspect of the
geometric explanation. Therefore, we address this claim first, beginning the story at the
end when the market is already partitioned between surviving generalists. We consider
the known tightest market packings, when generalists' spatial configuration is close to
optimal. This is not a trivial assumption, since realizing dense packings may require
lengthy reconfiguration. However, if many market segments were left unexploited, then
specialists' presence would not require extra explanation.
Customer demands gradually become more diversified and elaborated, so in time the
resource space extends into new dimensions. Packing density falls with n. The
percentage of total demand accessible for generalists decreases (Figure 2), pockets open
between the spheres in which specialists with narrow niche can make footholds. The
increase of residual space is steep at each dimensional change. In one dimension, spheres
are linear sections that can fill up the resource space without residue. There are usually
no specialists in rough markets where products are differentiated only in one dimension
(or in none, like in extremely underdeveloped regions, or in some classical shortage
economies, Kornai 1980). Moving to two dimensions, the loss in generalist resource
utilization is about ten percent (Table 1); so some resource pockets already open even in
such poorly differentiated markets. When moving from two to three dimensions,
generalists’ maximal resource share falls to 75%. The next few dimensional shifts yield
roughly 20% loss per step in occupied territory percentage. The decline even gets steeper
                                                       
7 Other organizational niche theories assess competitive advantages via organizational  fitness
(Levins 1968; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Then, specialists may be superior competitors to
generalists, fitting better their output to the needs of  particular customer groups.15
from n = 8. In ten dimensions, the spheres occupy only 10% of the resource space at
best!
The present argument does not exploit the notion of market center: generalists leave
unabsorbed resources in every segment of the market. So theoretically, specialists may
make footholds at any region of taste. However, the geometric approach, alone, does not
explain why specialists’ occurrence is more frequent at non-mainstream tastes. Here the
original and the proposed resource partitioning models complement each other. Imagine
the homogeneous resource distribution in two dimensions as an elastic membrane and
add inhomogeneities to the flat surface: humps will stand for market centers. The strong
competition at the resource abundant areas outforce most of the specialists. So in the one
hand, opportunities do open for specialists even at the market centers (geometric
explanation), but their survival ratio is much higher at the margins (scale economy
explanation).
3.4 Increasing Niche width, Decreasing Number of Generalists
Resource partitioning theory predicts that the number of generalist decreases in time, the
survivors increase their niche and move towards the market centers. Since homogeneous
resource distributions have no centers, we only address the first two effects. Falling
packing density as n increases explains the decreasing number of generalists: less and
less percentage of the total resource base remains accessible for them. Some agents must
quit. But what can be said about the survivors’ radius?
Assume that total demand is by and large constant in time; then, each subsequent
market phase represents the same purchasing power. Organizations extend their niche
along the new demand dimension. One way of doing this is making bids in all taste
categories of the new dimension. For example, this would mean that circular niches take
cylindrical shape in moving from two to three dimensions. In Figure 3, the circles occupy
the same ratio of the plane as the cylinders in the 3D box; consequently, packing density
remains the same with this kind of dimensional expansion in place. However, having k
taste categories along the added dimension would mean k times bigger product range
than before. In car collision control, such a niche extension would mean offering each
earlier model in several versions: without airbags, with driver bag, with two front bags,
also with side bags, etc. The earlier argument against asymmetric niches applies:
overextension in any direction is inefficient. It is better to assume that organizations16
compromise on the width of the new taste dimension, and end up in a symmetric niche
now in n+1 dimensions.
Figure 2. The Density of the Known Densest Packings
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Folding out the circles into spheres with preserving their radius could leave plenty of
unabsorbed space: Figure 3 may seem to show the emergence of new, unbound
resources. However, purchasing power does not increase, rather, it is distributed along
a higher number of taste "cells". Having constant total demand and more spatial
dimensions, resource density gradually thins out. A sphere with a certain radius
occupies a much lower share of the resource base than its ancestor circle with the
same radius in 2D. Losing volume percentage means losing customers. If
organizations want to preserve their market shares (or not surrender too much of it),
then they have to increase their niche width following dimensional shifts. In the scale
economy based model, the surviving generalists occupied new territories as a reward
of the competition. Now, they must increase their niches not to lose sales.
How big is the radius change that counterbalances resource thinning out?
Hypersphere volumes are proportional to r
n (where r is sphere radius), therefore a k17
times sphere volume increase means only 
nÖk times bigger radius. The required niche
extension is "dispersed" over the taste dimensions. Table 2 gives the degree of radius
extensions required to preserve the spheres’ volume percentage in the extended space
(rn+1/rn). For example, if the added axis is two, three and five times longer, respectively,
than sphere diameter (d), then the transition between five and five dimensions indicates
31%, 40% and 52% radius growth. That is, if the range of the new demand aspect is five
times longer than d (what is a lot since generalists have broad niche), then the niche has
to extend with a half to preserve the original market share. In higher dimensions, the
extension is even less. However, the shift between lower dimensions requires quite big
niche span increase (Table 2). That is, the appearance of a new taste dimension in early,
undifferentiated markets may impel generalists to increase their niche considerably what
also means strong competition.
Up till now, the geometric model gave an account for specialists' emergence and
for increasing market concentration with time (fewer generalist organizations with
broader niches). The specified effects are quite robust. Even a moderately increasing
overall demand could not counterbalance the steep fall in packing density and
resource thinning out. So, dimensional expansion may be a major cause of generalists’
high concentration.
Table 2.  The Required Niche Extension After Dimensional Change
n ® n+1 h = 2d h = 3d h = 5d
1 ® 2 1.68 2.05 2.65
2 ® 3 1.54 1.77 2.10
3 ® 4 1.42 1.57 1.80
4 ® 5 1.38 1.49 1.65
5 ® 6 1.31 1.40 1.52
6 ® 7 1.27 1.35 1.46
7 ® 8 1.23 1.31 1.3918
8 ® 9 1.27 1.33 1.40
9 ® 10 1.86 1.28 1.39
Notes. h denotes demand range along the added  n+1
th dimension; d is generalist niche breadth
given as sphere diameter. Cell contents show the niche extension (rn+1/rn) necessary to preserve
the market share of a generalist in the extended space.
3.5 Generalists Restrained?
How stable is a resource partitioning? If the importance of resource pockets between
hyperspheres increases with time, so that they finally occupy the overwhelming majority
of resource space, then why do not generalists absorb these spots? We introduce three
additional explanatory notions: covering density, deep hole and kissing number. With
these concepts, we formulate arguments that generalists most probably will leave some
residual space for specialists, especially in higher dimensional resource spaces.
The residual space between spheres can only be absorbed if generalists modify their
Figure 3. Cilindrical Niche Extension19
niche. The change can take place in each direction simultaneously (radius increase), or in
selected directions. Let us begin with the first option. If generalists increase their niches
preserving their spherical form, then finally they will cover the whole resource space.
The extended niches necessarily overlap: each generalist organization competes with all
of its neighbors. When the covering of the resource space is complete, another
mathematical notion, the thickness of the covering (Q) applies. While the sphere
packing problem is about densely filling up the space with spheres, the covering problem
searches the thinnest covering of the space with hyperspheres of equal size (Figure 4).
Covering thickness measures overlap, telling the average number of spheres that contain
a given point in space. If each point belongs exactly to one sphere, then Q = 1. Such
sphere covering is not possible beyond one dimensions, therefore Q ³  1.
The thinnest coverings are only known up till two dimensions. The best center
arrangement in 2D is the hexagonal, Q = 1.2092 (Figure 4).8 Fortunately, lower bounds
on Q are given for each dimension, and the known thinnest coverings well approximate
these bounds if n is not high. Covering thickness steeply increases with the number of
dimensions (Table 1, Figure 5). Beyond five dimensions, the minimal covering thickness
exceeds two; then, more than two producers compete for a customer on average. So, the
occupation of resource pockets via spherical niche extension is costly: it ignites strong
competition as customer tastes become sophisticated.
The argument against niche overlap can be tightened as follows. A well-known
formula from industrial organization, which indicates the relation between
profitability and number of equal competitors (m), is as follows (Shapiro 1989):
L = (p-c)/p = 1/(m×e)
Where: L is the Lerner index of profitability, p is price, c is marginal cost, and e is
price elasticity in absolute value. If price discrimination is not feasible, one must
offer one price to all customers. The price throughout the niche then equals the
lowest price, which is the one offered in the niche overlap by the highest number of
competitors. This implies that profitability, as measured by the Lerner index, is
                                                       
8 Note that in general, radius extension in the densest sphere packing does not yield the
thinnest covering.20
lower than 1/(Q×e). Since Q increases steeply with the number of product
dimensions, the loss of profitability due to niche overlap increases steeply.
Figure 4. The Thinnest Space Covering in Two Dimensions21
Figure 5. The Known Thinnest Coverings
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The other way to occupy the residual space is that generalists extend their niches
only in the directions of resource pockets, yielding non-spherical and often
asymmetric niches. Obviously, all pockets can be covered without niche overlap if
the constraint of spherical niche form is dropped. However, as we mentioned before,
overstretching the niche asymmetrically has a price. How big an extension is
necessary for a generalist to reach the heart of a neighboring pocket, the deep hole
(Figure 6)?
The distance between a sphere center and a neighboring deep hole is the
covering radius (R). The ratio of the covering and the packing radius, R/r, stands
for the magnitude of  the required overstretch. R/r varies over different packings; for
example, in case of quite simple square packings (where niche centers form a lattice
of hypercubes) it grows to infinity with the number of dimensions. The growth is
much less dramatic in dense arrangements. Then, the covering radius R is less than22
the double of r: otherwise another generalist could be inserted into the deep holes.
However, a 40-70% overstretch required beyond two dimensions to reach the deep
hole (Conway and Sloane 1988:158) may be too high a price for the extension to a
single pocket. This is especially the case if the residual space is distributed along an
increasingly fragmented pocket structure. These aspects lead to the next point.
Generalists have more potential competitors as time passes. In mathematical
terms, the kissing number (t), the number of immediate neighbors that touch a
certain sphere increases rapidly with n (Figure 7). For example, the kissing number
in the known best packings is 24, 72 and 240 at four, six and eight dimensions,
respectively (Table 1). The question then is what grows faster: the value of the prey
(resource pocket ratio) or the number of predators? The data in Table 1 suggest that
the number of neighbors increases much faster than the leftout space ratio: e.g.,
meanwhile packing density becomes 10 times smaller between one and ten
dimensions, the kissing number gets 186 time bigger. The steep growth of kissing
numbers means that the residual space becomes fragmented: more and more
resource pockets appear with n (an aspect pointed out by Glenn Carroll).
Massively growing covering thickness, overstretch costs and expansion of the
kissing number; these structural effects make the occupation of resource pockets
increasingly unprofitable for generalists relative to the potential benefits. This may
allow for specialist “Switzerlands” to survive among generalist superpowers. Note
moreover that organizational perception limits may also play a role in higher
dimensions: as pockets around generalists rapidly proliferate, the chance of simply
overlooking some of them increases.
4. Discussion
4.1 Sphere Packings as Market Partition Models
The paper addressed some consequences of dimensional change on the organizations
populating the resource space. The geometric properties of sphere packings and
coverings offer new explanations for resource partitioning processes in generalist-23
specialist markets. How do resource pockets open for specialists? Why does the
number of generalists decrease, and why do generalist niches broaden with time?
Applying the sphere packing problem to the generalism-specialism problem, a
handful of simplifications had to be made: organizations are able to realize dense
market packings, niches are spherical and their widths are similar. Exact
mathematical results on the one hand, and a possible lack of realism on the other
hand. Are the outlined tendencies strong enough to prevail? Putting this differently,
which are the socio-economic conditions under which the outlined tendencies
prevail? What we demonstrated is that dimensional expansion has very robust
structural effects on sphere packings and coverings, which are likely to have
visible effects.24
Stinchcombe (1991) calls mechanisms those pieces of scientific reasoning that
connect lower and higher level entities in theories. He argues that objects at the
lower can be conceptualized as very simple if this characterization provides
sufficient explanation for the higher level outcomes (like gas molecules are modeled as
little balls in classical gas theory). Organizational ecology, and hence the resource
partitioning model exemplify multilevel theories: organizational events appear as
cumulative outcomes at the population level. Therefore, we modeled our lower level
objects with spheres in the belief that this choice provides a simple and powerful
explanatory mechanism. Obviously, organizations are much more complex to be
exhaustively represented with spheres. But the spherical approach may serve as a
baseline model for generalizations. One can add variations to it and speculate about the
qualitative outcomes, even if much of the mathematical rigor that characterized the
original setting is lost. For example, loosening the constraint on resource homogeneity
would introduce niche breadth variations among generalists. Resource abundance may
make some extra niche extension profitable. Generalists positioned at the resourceful
regions get bigger in niche and in size. The resulting scenery might resemble to soap
foam: some of the bubbles are large, and the fluid between them is filled up with very
little bubbles. This picture highlights that the ratio of abandoned resource space is very
small when generalists’ niche width is very much bigger than that of specialists: little
balls can tightly fill up the residual place between the big balloons. Maybe generalists’
high concentration is a form of efficient market exploitation?
Up till now we used the terms catchment area and niche synonimously. However,
there is a conceptual difference between the two. One can speak about organizational
catchment area if an organization addresses a certain range of customer taste with a
single product. In geometric terms: products are located at sphere centers. Customers
within the catchment area have to compromise on their specific demands, buying
somewhat different products from what they would prefer. The same region in the
resource space can be called niche if the organization addresses each taste in this area
with a dedicated product. It may depend on the nature of the product which of the
interpretations applies. A crucial question is if bids are sparsely or densely distributed in
the market. The space industry is a good example for the catchment area approach:
telecommunication firms have not too many options when choosing between satellite
launching possibilities. The textile industry may exemplify the niche approach: each firm
offers products in a broad variety of sizes, colors and qualities.25
The catchment area approach has certain analytical advantages: it yields
determinacy of boundaries and sizes of the areas. The boundaries are determined by
customers who compare producers’ total price. This price consists of production costs
plus a generalized notion of “transportation costs”: the price of deviating from the
customer’s ideal product, represented by his/her location in product characteristics space
(Eaton and Lipsey 1989). The size of catchment areas is next determined by a free entry
equilibrium, where profit due to product differentiation equals fixed set-up costs. In a
later article we will embed the applied geometry in that economic framework. We will
also include a specific model of economy of scale, and formalize the structure of variable
costs and fixed capacity costs that we proposed in our arguments for spherical niches.
The economy of scale model, together with the model of customers’ transportation costs
should help to become more explicit concerning the survival conditions of small
specialists relative to big generalists.
4.2. Topics for Empirical Justification
The basic objective of the paper was theoretical: to give new insights and to provide a
tool for further theory building, placing the original resource partitioning model into a
substantially different explanatory context. The geometric explanation is strong enough
to predict the main phases and outcomes of resource partitioning histories, but so far it
had little to say about the organizational procedures that finally end up in the specified
outcomes. The geometric approach provided a few new predictions that are consistent
with the field. It explains specialist organizations’ presence in early markets. By pointing
out the existence of resource pockets in non-marginal taste positions, we got closer to the
explanation of the fact why can some specialists make footholds in demand abundant
market segments in spite of generalists’ presence.
We predicted a number of effects from an increase of the number of product
characteristics. Leftout space rapidly increases its share and it fragments, thus increasing
opportunities for small specialists. This yields a question for empirical testing: does the
share of specialist organizations increase with the number of product dimensions? This
being the case, it is in the interest of small outsiders to innovate products by adding to
the number of product dimensions, and it is against the interest of large incumbent
generalists. This may give a new twist to the debate on the innovativeness of large versus
small firms (Nooteboom 1994b). Given spherical niches, the alternative to having small26
specialists in the residual space between generalist hyperspheres is that generalists
occupy leftout space and overlap their niches. We showed that the penalty in the form of
lower profitability due to competition increases with the number of taste dimensions. To
the extent that niches can profitably be non-spherical and non-symmetrical, generalists
can occupy left-out space without niche overlap, so that opportunities for small
specialists disappear. We proposed that the profitability of such non-spherical niches
depends on the share of fixed “costs of reach”. In other words: in industries with low
fixed costs of reach relative to variable costs, ceteris paribus (at a given number of
product dimensions, and a given size of economy of scale), there will be a low share of
small specialists. All these predictions can be tested empirically. Industries like book
publishing and musical recording could be feasible candidates for investigation (Carroll
1997).
The distinction between catchment areas and niches may also yield topics for
empirical research. The hypothesis is that the degree of product differentiation and the
density of similar offers in an industry have a decisive role whether catchment areas or
niches are formed. The scarcity of bids in the product characteristics space may
correspond to catchment area formation: customers have to compromise on their tastes
seriously. Conversely, the abundance of similar products in the market would facilitate
niche formation. The interplay between these two processes could be studied in a
temporal context in markets where the lack of product variety is suddenly replaced by an
overwhelming abundance of offers. For example, Eastern Europe with its rapid socio-
economic transition offers an excellent opportunity for this kind of research.
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